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Rules Limiting Athletic Performance  
or Prohibiting Athletic Participation  
for Health Reasons:  
Legal and Ethical Considerations
Matthew J. Mitten
This article analyzes the paradox between: 1) intercollegiate sport’s objectives of 
maximizing athletic performance and providing athletic participation opportunities to 
those possessing the requisite physical ability and skills to compete successfully; and 
2) National Collegiate Athletic Association rules that limit athletic performance by all 
student-athletes, or university requirements that prohibit individual student-athletes 
from participating in intercollegiate sports, for health reasons. Some student-athletes 
seek to maximize athletic performance by taking performance-enhancing substances, 
even if doing so creates potential future adverse health effects. Others may want to 
participate in intercollegiate sports with a physical abnormality and are willing to 
assume an increased risk or severity of injury beyond that inherent in the sport. How-
ever, the NCAA and its member universities, as producers and regulators of intercol-
legiate sports, have valid legal authority and ethical grounds to promulgate and 
enforce health, safety, and competition rules that limit the autonomy interests of adult 
student-athletes.
The theme of this year’s scholarly colloquium on intercollegiate athletics is 
whether excellence in sport is compatible with good health. I will explore the 
converse of this theme by considering whether student-athlete eligibility rules to 
promote good health justify limits and restrictions on the pursuit of excellence in 
intercollegiate sport. My presentation will analyze whether, based on legal and 
ethical considerations, eligibility rules that limit athletic performance or prohibit 
athletic participation for health reasons despite medical uncertainty strike an 
appropriate balance between providing opportunities for student-athletes to par-
ticipate and excel in intercollegiate athletics and maintaining their good health.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) mission (National 
Collegiate Athletic Association [NCAA], 2009) includes the “pursuit of excel-
lence in both academics and athletics” by student-athletes and “an inclusive cul-
ture that fosters equitable participation for student-athletes” in athletics among its 
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core values (i.e., “essential and enduring principles”). Guideline 3a of the NCAA 
Sports Medicine Handbook (2008c) provides that “the NCAA encourages partici-
pation by student-athletes with physical or mental impairments in intercollegiate 
athletics and physical activities to the full extent of their interest and abilities” and 
that a student-athlete should be given an opportunity to participate if “he or she 
has the requisite abilities and skills in spite of his or her impairment” (p. 78).
The NCAA’s core purpose (i.e., “reason for being”) is “to govern [intercol-
legiate athletics] competition in a fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner.” 
In fact, the NCAA was founded in 1905 to promote health and safety in intercol-
legiate sports, specifically football.1 Article 2.2 of the NCAA Constitution 
expressly states that “[i]ntercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a 
manner designed to protect and enhance the physical and educational well-being 
of student-athletes” and “[i]t is the responsibility of each member institution to 
protect the health of and provide a safe environment for each of its participating 
student-athletes” (NCAA, 2008a, p. 3).
There is an inherent conflict between: 1) intercollegiate sport’s objectives of 
achieving athletics excellence and providing athletic participation opportunities to 
those possessing the requisite physical ability and skills; and 2) eligibility rules 
established by the NCAA’s drug-testing program that limit the bounds of athletic 
performance by all student-athletes, or those of a university that medically dis-
qualify certain individual student-athletes from participating in intercollegiate 
sports for health reasons. Some student-athletes seek to maximize their athletic 
performance and are willing to assume the risks of potential adverse health effects, 
by taking performance-enhancing substances such as anabolic androgenic ste-
roids or steroid precursors. The former are synthetic variations of testosterone (the 
primary male hormone) that mimic its effects by having both muscle-building and 
masculinizing characteristics The latter are synthetic substances that after inges-
tion metabolize into the functional equivalent of anabolic steroids (hereafter both 
substances will be referred to as “ anabolic steroids”). Others with the requisite 
physical capabilities have sought an opportunity to participate in intercollegiate 
athletics with a known physical abnormality such as a missing or nonfunctioning 
paired organ (e.g., an eye or kidney), spinal stenosis, or a cardiovascular condition 
that creates a potential for increased risk or severity of injury to oneself in addition 
to the inherent risks of playing a sport.
I will focus on two specific issues that raise important legal and ethical ques-
tions about health-related eligibility rules that seemingly conflict with some of the 
objectives of intercollegiate athletics and/or the autonomy interests of adult stu-
dent-athletes: 1) limiting athletic performance and the pursuit of excellence in 
intercollegiate sports by prohibiting all student-athletes from using anabolic ste-
roids and requiring compliance with the NCAA’s drug-testing program; and 2) 
excluding an individual student-athlete with the requisite physical capability and 
skills from participating in intercollegiate athletics based on the team physician’s 
medical judgment that a his or her physical abnormality creates an unacceptable 
risk of personal injury.
Rules Limiting Performance or Prohibiting Participation  101
Limiting Athletic Performance by Banning  
the Use of Anabolic Steroids
NCAA rules have prohibited drug use by student-athletes since 1973. In a nation-
wide survey of NCAA student-athletes conducted by Michigan State University 
in the early 1980s, 4% of all respondents and 9% of football players reported 
using anabolic steroids. The NCAA’s drug testing program was initiated in 1986 
“[s]o that no one participant might have an artificially induced advantage, so that 
no one participant might be pressured to use chemical substances in order to 
remain competitive, and to safeguard the health and safety of participants” 
(NCAA, 2008b, p. 2). The list of banned substances “consists of substances gen-
erally purported to be performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful to the 
health and safety of the student-athlete,” including anabolic steroids and steroid 
precursors (NCAA, 2008b, p. 2). Stimulants (e.g., amphetamines) and illegal rec-
reational drugs (e.g., marijuana), as well as substances that can be used to mask 
prohibited substances, are also banned. Guideline 1g of the 2008–09 NCAA 
Sports Medicine Handbook (2008) states that the NCAA “denounce(s)” student-
athletes’ use of nontherapeutic drugs, which is “contrary to the rules and ethical 
principles of athletics competition” (p. 21). As a condition of being eligible to 
participate in intercollegiate athletics, each student-athlete must consent to submit 
to random, suspicionless drug testing during all NCAA championships, Division 
I FBS games, and during the off season (Divisions I and II only).
A student-athlete does not have a legal right to participate in intercollegiate 
athletics. Rather, a student-athlete’s eligibility to participate in intercollegiate 
sports is based on a consensual relationship that requires compliance with the 
terms of a contract with his or her university, including the NCAA’s drug testing 
program. However, to prevent violation of a student-athlete’s constitutional or 
civil rights protected by federal or state law, a rule conditioning his or her athletic 
eligibility on not using prohibited performance-enhancing substances such as 
anabolic steroids must further legitimate and important NCAA objectives.
In Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that a public school district’s requirement that all students choosing to participate 
in interscholastic athletics must agree to submit to random, suspicionless testing 
for illegal recreational drugs does not violate the United States Constitution. 
Although student-athletes have legally recognized privacy interests, they have a 
lessened expectation of privacy and voluntarily subject themselves to greater reg-
ulation by choosing to participate in high school sports. Moreover, as unemanci-
pated minors, they are entrusted by their parents or guardian to the custodial care 
of school officials who have a legal duty to protect their health and safety while 
engaged in interscholastic athletics. The Court held that the high school’s legiti-
mate interests in deterring illegal drug use, preventing disruption of the educa-
tional process, and protecting minor student-athletes’ health outweighed the “not 
significant” infringement of their privacy, thereby justifying its mandatory random 
drug testing program. However, the Court “caution[ed] against the assumption 
that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other con-
texts”2 such as intercollegiate athletics.
The NCAA is a private association rather than a governmental entity. There-
fore, it is not subject to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution prohibiting all 
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units of government (including public universities that are members of the NCAA) 
from subjecting individuals to unreasonable searches (which includes the collec-
tion and analysis of bodily fluids to determine the presence of prohibited sub-
stances) or otherwise infringing their privacy rights. However, the NCAA’s drug 
testing program has been challenged on the ground it violates certain state 
constitutions.
Before discussing state constitutional law issues, I will first consider whether 
it is appropriate (i.e., ethical) for the NCAA to limit an adult student-athlete’s 
ability to maximize his or her athletic performance in competitive sports by pro-
hibiting the use of anabolic steroids. Athletes take anabolic steroids because they 
work. When combined with vigorous training, they enhance sports performance 
by making athletes bigger, stronger, and faster, and also increase their recovery 
time after strenuous physical activity. By enhancing human performance capabili-
ties, anabolic steroids further the ultimate objective of adult elite competitive 
sport, which is winning an athletic event by performing the best.
Elite sports competition, including intercollegiate sports, is based on a model 
of athletic Darwinism because the best athletes are permitted to exploit their 
respective “natural” genetic advantages without regulation or limitation by sports 
governing bodies. Michael Phelps, who has several unique physical characteris-
tics such as exceptionally large feet and flexibility in his ankles, won 8 gold medals 
in swimming during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Usain Bolt, an unusually tall 6’ 
5” Jamaican sprinter, set world records in the 100 m and 200 m dash during the 
Beijing Olympics. (It is interesting to note that Bolt’s father has claimed his son’s 
sprinting prowess is attributable to a life-long appetite for Jamaican yams.) Eero 
Maentyranta, a Finnish cross country skier who won three gold medals during the 
1964 Olympics subsequently was found to have a genetic mutation that caused his 
blood to have 40–50% more red blood cells than average. Because all athletes are 
not created equal in terms of their natural abilities, a completely level playing field 
does not exist. Moreover, some athletes have access to better nutrition, coaching, 
and training equipment and facilities, which provides a further unregulated com-
petitive advantage.
Athletes have always sought to enhance their performance through the use of 
“artificial means,” which today is fueled by the substantial economic and intan-
gible rewards for extraordinary athletic achievements. It is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to find a principled basis to distinguish permissible athletic perfor-
mance enhancement by “artificial” means from those that provide a prohibited 
“unfair” competitive advantage. Although they are not universally available to all 
athletes because of their differing economic resources, some dietary supplements 
(e.g., creatine) and training techniques (such as artificially created low-oxygen 
living environments in low altitude training areas) currently may be used to 
enhance athletic performance. It would be unnecessary to attempt to distinguish 
between permissible vs. prohibited “artificial” means of athletic performance 
enhancement if consenting adult student-adults were permitted to use anabolic 
steroids.3
The NCAA is committed to the “pursuit of excellence in both academics and 
athletics” by student-athletes, so what is wrong with permitting student-athletes to 
reap the benefits of 21st century pharmacology, especially those less naturally 
gifted? NCAA rules seek to create an educational environment that facilitates, 
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rather than limits, each student-athlete’s individual academic performance. For 
example, the NCAA does not prohibit the use of No Doze or other products with 
high amounts of stimulants such as caffeine by student-athletes during late night 
study for an exam,4 but a positive test for a stimulant above a certain threshold 
violates the NCAA’s drug testing program.
One of the reasons the NCAA bans anabolic steroids is because of their actual 
and potential harmful effects on student-athletes. Some of the short-term adverse 
health effects of anabolic steroid use by males include reduced sperm production, 
testicular atrophy, and acne— which are largely reversible after usage is stopped. 
Clinical data suggests some anabolic steroid users will subject themselves to an 
increased risk of cardiovascular or liver disease. However, currently there are no 
definitive scientific or epidemiological studies evidencing that a healthy adult’s 
usage of anabolic steroids in appropriate dosages necessarily will have life-
threatening or long-term serious health effects. It also is presently unknown 
whether abuse of anabolic steroids contributes to violence and other behavioral 
disorders.
Anabolic steroids are controlled substances regulated by federal and state 
laws, which prohibit a physician from prescribing, or the usage or possession of, 
anabolic steroids for the purpose of enhancing athletic performance.5 Many 
experts believe the available medical case reports justify prohibiting the use of 
anabolic steroids solely to enhance athletic performance. But some medical and 
scientific experts argue in favor of allowing fully informed, consenting adult ath-
letes to use anabolic steroids with proper medical supervision, notably Dr. Norman 
Fost, professor of pediatric medicine and director of the Program in Bioethics at 
the University of Wisconsin—Madison. He asserts it is hypocritical to prohibit the 
use of anabolic steroids (which cause less documented harm than legal substances 
such as alcohol and tobacco) while permitting the use of other artificial means of 
athletic performance enhancement such as high-technology sports equipment. For 
many years he has advocated that adult amateur and professional athletes should 
be permitted to take anabolic steroids under a physician’s supervision.6
Conducting scientific studies on humans to determine whether the use of ana-
bolic steroids solely to enhance athletic performance has serious adverse health 
effects would be illegal and raises important ethical issues, so what is the right 
thing to do in the face of this medical uncertainty?
The accounting profession requires that a conservative approach be taken 
when the economic value of an asset is uncertain. Given that the health and welfare 
of young athletes (perhaps life itself) is at stake, it is entirely appropriate for the 
NCAA to apply this same principle and to adopt a conservative position regarding 
whether student-athletes are permitted to assume uncertain health risks that are 
potentially dangerous—particularly given today’s “win at all costs” philosophy in 
elite competitive sport. It has been reported more than one-half of the 198 
respondents to a 1995 informal survey of U.S. Olympic athletes (many of whom 
were weightlifters) that was conducted by Chicago physician and author Bob 
Goldman said “yes” to following question: “You are offered a banned performance-
enhancing substance that comes with two guarantees: 1) You will not be caught. 
2) You will win every competition you enter for the next five years, and then you 
will die from the side effects of the substance. Would you take it?” (Bamberger & 
Yeager, 1997, ¶ 3)
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In his January 2004 State of the Union speech President George Bush stated: 
“The use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, football and 
other sports is dangerous. It sends the wrong message that there are shortcuts to 
accomplishment and that performance is more important than character.”
Dr. Thomas H. Murray, president of The Hastings Center, astutely frames the 
issue as:
When performance-enhancing drugs have the power to overcome differences 
in natural talents and the willingness to sacrifice and persevere in the quest to 
perfect those talents, we cannot avoid confronting the question, “What do we 
value in sport?” (Murray, ¶ 20)
The unregulated use of anabolic steroids as a means of enhancing athletic 
performance threatens to undermine the essential nature and integrity of competi-
tive sport and transform it into merely a spectacle or an exhibition of an athletic 
accomplishment. As Dr. Arthur L. Caplan, Emanuel and Robert Hart Professor of 
Bioethics, Chair, Department of Medical Ethics, and Director, Center for Bioeth-
ics, University of Pennsylvania observes:
“Sport is only sport if it is measuring human abilities, as varied as those may 
be. Sport also links the results achieved to training, will, and effort. Outcomes 
don’t define sport—the process leading to outcomes does. . . . So at least in 
sports, if not . . . in the classroom, it is how the performance is achieved and 
not just the performance that is valued. (Caplan, 2008)
Professor M. Andrew Holowchak explains that this concept/definition of 
competitive sport, which he calls “aretism,” originated in ancient Greece where “it 
is not victory itself that [was] prized most, but the manner in which it is attained.” 
(Holowchak, 2000)
Professor Michael Sandel, a Harvard political philosopher, agrees with this view, 
but posits a “deeper danger” is the resulting corruption of “athletic competition as a 
human activity that honors the cultivation and display of natural talents,” which may 
“erode the part of athletic performance that celebrates natural talents and gifts.” Rec-
ognizing that some forms of technological enhancement should be universally permit-
ted to cultivate natural athletic talent (e.g., wearing running shoes in a race), he notes 
that the purpose of the specific athletic competition and its relevant virtues must be 
considered to evaluate the ethics of a particular means of performance enhancement. 
Therefore, maintaining the integrity of a specific type or brand of sports competition 
and furthering its objectives “means writing the rules in a way that honors excellences 
central to the game and rewards the skills of those who play it best.” (Sandel, 2007)
The sport’s governing body is in the best position to establish appropriate 
athlete eligibility rules consistent with the particular brand of athletic competition 
it has chosen to produce or sponsor.7 Article 1.3.1 of the NCAA Constitution 
states that the NCAA’s core purpose is “to govern [intercollegiate athletics] com-
petition in a fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner” and its fundamental 
policy is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational 
program” (NCAA, 2008a, p. 1) To further these objectives and values, the NCAA 
has chosen to define its brand of athletic competition as “drug-free” sport by 
establishing student-athlete eligibility rules that prohibit the use of steroids. Thus, 
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it is proper and ethical for the NCAA to prohibit the use of anabolic steroids by 
adult student-athletes even if doing so effectively limits the maximization of their 
individual athletic performances.
Because eligibility rules banning anabolic steroids and a system of policing 
compliance, which includes the collection and analysis of a urine sample to deter-
mine the presence of steroids in a student-athlete’s body, are necessary to further 
legitimate and important objectives of the NCAA, the California Supreme Court 
upheld their legal validity in Hill v. NCAA (1994). The court initially recognized 
that sports competition requires a “special set of social norms” and that student-
athletes “normally and reasonably forgo a measure of their privacy in exchange 
for the personal and professional benefits of extracurricular activities.” For exam-
ple, they submit to regular physical examinations and reveal information about 
their medical condition to team physicians, coaches, and athletic trainers as well 
as undress in same-sex locker rooms.
The Hill court held:
A student athlete’s already diminished expectation of privacy is outweighed 
by the NCAA’s legitimate regulatory objectives in conducting testing for pro-
scribed drugs. As a sponsor and regulator of sporting events, the NCAA has 
self-evident interests in ensuring fair and vigorous competition, as well as 
protecting the health and safety of student athletes. These interests justify a 
set of drug testing rules reasonably calculated to achieve drug-free athletic 
competition. (Hill v. NCAA, 1994)
In Brennan v. Bd. of Trustees for Univ. of Louisiana Systems (1997), a Loui-
siana appellate court adopted the Hill court’s reasoning and held that the NCAA’s 
drug testing program does not violate the Louisiana constitution. However, in 
York v Wahkiakum School Dist. No. 200 (2008), the Washington Supreme Court 
recently ruled that a public high school’s student-athlete drug testing program 
violated the Washington state constitution. This program was modeled after the 
one in Oregon that, in the Vernonia case (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court found in 
compliance with the federal constitution. As one of the Washington Supreme 
Court’s justices acknowledged, this ruling makes NCAA drug testing of adult 
student-athletes in the state of Washington “problematic.”
The York case threatens to prevent the equal treatment of all NCAA student-
athletes that is created by a uniform drug testing program and athletic eligibility 
rules that apply nationally. A necessary hallmark of competitive athletics is that 
the sports governing body’s rules must apply equally to all athletes. For example, 
the NCAA’s drug testing program requires uniform national application for the 
NCAA to govern intercollegiate athletics in a fair and equitable manner and to 
achieve its legitimate and important objective of drug-free sport.8
The NCAA’s drug testing program is modeled after similar programs origi-
nally adopted by the International Olympic Committee and United States Olym-
pic Committee. The sanction imposed on a student-athlete for a first positive test 
for anabolic steroid usage is a 1 year suspension from competition in all NCAA 
sports (NCAA Bylaw 18.4.1.5 in NCAA, 2008b, p. 4) rather than the 2 year sus-
pension that the World Antidoping Code provides for the first doping offense by 
an Olympic sport athlete.9 However, NCAA Bylaw 18.4.1.5.3 states that “[a] student-
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athlete under a drug-testing suspension from a national or international sports 
governing body that has adopted the World Anti-doping Agency (WADA) Code 
shall not participate in NCAA intercollegiate competition for the duration of the 
suspension,” which may exceed 1 year. But his or her NCAA eligibility is not 
otherwise affected.
The NCAA’s drug testing program is effectively reducing the use of anabolic 
steroids by student-athletes. NCAA survey results indicate that anabolic steroid 
usage has declined from 4.9% in 1989 to 1.2% in 2005.10 More than 60% of the 
student-athletes responding to a 2005 NCAA survey believe the NCAA should 
drug test and that this deters anabolic steroid usage (Hosick, 2005).
The NCAA’s drug testing program has some important procedural safeguards 
that consider a student-athlete’s individual circumstances. There is a therapeutic 
use exception procedure that permits a student-athlete to participate in intercol-
legiate athletics while using anabolic steroids for a legitimate medical reason 
(e.g., treatment of hormonal problems) with the prior approval of the NCAA 
Committee on Competitive Safeguards and Medical Aspects of Sports (CSMAS). 
Although a positive test for anabolic steroids is a strict liability offense, a student-
athlete has the right to require his or her educational institution to appeal a posi-
tive test result to the CSMAS. It is authorized to eliminate the standard 1 year 
suspension from intercollegiate athletics competition or reduce the suspension to 
one-half year based on the specific circumstances giving rise to a student-athlete’s 
positive test.11
Exclusion From Athletic Participation  
Because of a Physical Abnormality
Let us assume the following: An adult student-athlete has the required physical 
capabilities and skills to play an intercollegiate sport with a missing or nonfunc-
tioning paired organ (e.g., an eye, kidney, or testicle) or a spinal or cardiovascular 
abnormality and that his or her participation does not increase the risk of injury to 
others.12 In addition, there is no definitive scientific evidence, only limited clinical 
data, and sports medicine experts disagree whether an increased risk or severity of 
harm to the student-athlete justifies medical disqualification from an intercolle-
giate sport. The student-athlete is fully informed that playing an intercollegiate 
sport with his medical condition may expose him to a potential enhanced risk of 
serious injury or possibly even death, but nevertheless wants to assume this risk 
and agrees not to hold his educational institution legally liable for any adverse 
health consequences if he is permitted to participate. The legal validity and 
enforceability of this waiver of liability is uncertain, but for purposes of this dis-
cussion assume it would be judicially upheld.13
This scenario, which is based on real life examples over the past 30 years, 
raises at least two important legal and ethical issues: 1) if an adult student-athlete 
has a physical abnormality that increases the risk of personal injury beyond the 
inherent risks of an intercollegiate sport, is there a legitimate reason to exclude 
him or her from participation; and 2) if so, whose evaluation of the medically 
acceptable nature and severity of an enhanced risk should be controlling?
Rules Limiting Performance or Prohibiting Participation  107
The Hill and Brennan courts, when considering the legal validity of eligibility 
rules prohibiting the use of steroids, ruled that the NCAA has a legitimate and 
important interest in protecting the health and safety of adult student-athletes. 
Guideline 3a of the NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook (2008c, p. 78) provides 
that a member university should medically disqualify a student-athlete from par-
ticipation in intercollegiate athletics only if his or her “physical impairment pres-
ents a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the student-
athlete and/or other participants that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable 
accommodations.” This guideline is consistent with the legal standard developed 
by courts in resolving lawsuits brought by a student-athlete claiming that the fed-
eral Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (which the Americans With Disabilities Act of 
1990 [ADA] is patterned after) provides a legal right to participate in intercolle-
giate athletics if he or she has the capability and skills to do so in spite of a physi-
cal impairment or medical condition.
Although there is no independent legal right to participate in intercollegiate 
athletics, the NCAA and its member universities must comply with the Rehabili-
tation Act and ADA, which prohibit discrimination based on an actual or per-
ceived disability and require that qualified student-athletes be given an equal 
opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics.14 An adult student-athlete 
does not, however, have an absolute right to choose to participate in intercolle-
giate athletics with a physical abnormality that creates a medically unreasonable 
increased risk of injury to oneself. A university may require that a student-athlete 
have reasonable physical qualifications to be eligible to participate in intercolle-
giate athletics, but the federal disability discrimination laws require an individual-
ized medical evaluation of his or her condition to determine whether there is a 
significant risk of substantial harm to oneself.15 If so, he or she may be excluded 
from the sport.
NCAA Guideline 3a (NCAA, 2008c, p. 78) recommends that a university 
“require joint approval from the physician most familiar with the student-athlete’s 
condition, the team physician, and an appropriate official of the institution as well 
as his or her parent(s) or guardian.” This recommendation generally is reasonable 
and workable in most instances, although its requirement that a parent or guardian 
consent to an adult student-athlete’s participation in intercollegiate athletics with 
a physical abnormality appears too paternalistic. It is, however, problematic when 
medical experts disagree regarding whether his or her participation would create 
a significant risk of substantial harm to oneself.
In the face of medically uncertain risks, whose evaluation of the risks should 
govern and who should make the athletic participation decision?
Initially, as a novice legal scholar in the early 1990s, I took a strong libertar-
ian position on this issue. I argued that a fully informed adult student-athlete 
should have the legal right under the federal disability discrimination laws to 
choose to participate in intercollegiate athletics with a physical abnormality if 
there are differing credible medical opinions regarding whether doing so would 
create a significant risk of substantial personal harm. For example, if the student-
athlete’s personal physician or consulting specialists provided medical clearance, 
he or she would be permitted to participate in intercollegiate athletics despite the 
university team physician’s judgment that participation with a physical abnormal-
ity creates a medically unreasonable risk of harm.
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However, as I matured as a scholar and had the opportunity to participate in 
several sports medicine conferences as a law professor with sports medicine legal 
expertise (experiences that significantly increased my understanding of the 
underlying medical issues), I began to question my earlier libertarian conclusions. 
I came full circle as a result of my involvement in a 1996 landmark case, Knapp 
v. Northwestern University (1996), in which I filed a pro bono amicus brief (i.e., 
friend of the court legal brief) on behalf of two sports medicine physician 
organizations arguing that, under the Rehabilitation Act, “the appropriate scope of 
judicial inquiry should be limited to determining whether there is a reasonable 
basis for the team physician’s medical disqualification of an athlete.” (Brief and 
Appendix of Amicus Curiae American Medical Society for Sports Medicine and 
American Osteopathic Academy of Sports Medicine in Support of Defendants-
Appellants Northwestern University and Rick Taylor, filed in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, October 21, 1996 at p. 14)
The facts of this case are as follows. As a high school senior, Nicholas Knapp 
accepted a scholarship to play basketball at Northwestern University. The summer 
before entering college, he suffered sudden cardiac arrest while playing recre-
ational basketball, which required cardiopulmonary resuscitation and defibrilla-
tion to restart his heart. Thereafter, he had an internal cardioverter-defibrillator 
implanted in his abdomen. He subsequently played competitive recreational bas-
ketball without any incidents of cardiac arrest and received medical clearance to 
play college basketball from three cardiologists who examined him.
Although other cardiologists were willing to provide medical clearance, 
Northwestern’s team physician did not medically clear Knapp to play intercolle-
giate basketball. His medical judgment was based on an individualized evaluation 
of his medical records and history, the 26th Bethesda Conference consensus medi-
cal guidelines for athletic participation with cardiovascular abnormalities (a con-
ference that I participated in), and opinions of two consulting cardiologists who 
concluded that Knapp would expose himself to a significant risk of ventricular 
fibrillation or cardiac arrest during competitive athletics.
All medical experts agreed on the following facts: Knapp had suffered sudden 
cardiac death due to ventricular fibrillation; even with the internal defibrillator, 
playing college basketball places Knapp at a higher risk for suffering another 
event of sudden cardiac death compared with other male college basketball play-
ers; the internal defibrillator has never been tested under the conditions of inter-
collegiate basketball; and no person currently plays or has ever played college or 
professional basketball after suffering sudden cardiac death and having a defibril-
lator implanted. But they sharply disagreed whether the risks were substantial 
enough to justify Knapp’s exclusion from participation in intercollegiate 
basketball.
Despite the willingness of Knapp and his parents to sign a liability waiver, 
Northwestern accepted its team physician’s medical recommendation not to allow 
Knapp to play intercollegiate basketball, but agreed to honor his athletic scholar-
ship. Knapp claimed that Northwestern’s decision violated the Rehabilitation Act 
because his medical condition did not in fact expose him to a significant risk of 
substantial harm while playing competitive basketball. At trial, after weighing the 
experts’ conflicting testimony, the district court concluded that Knapp’s enhanced 
medical risks are not substantial and that the implanted defibrillator most likely 
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would restore his heart rhythm to normal if it became irregular during strenuous 
physical exertion.
Reversing this decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that Knapp’s exclusion from Northwestern’s intercollegiate basket-
ball team was legally justified:
We disagree with the district court’s legal determination that such decisions 
are to be made by the courts and believe instead that medical determinations 
of this sort are best left to team doctors and universities as long as they are 
made with reason and rationality and with full regard to possible and reason-
able accommodations. In cases such as ours, where Northwestern has exam-
ined both Knapp and his medical records, has considered his medical history 
and the relation between his prior sudden cardiac death and the possibility 
of future occurrences, has considered the severity of the potential injury, and 
has rationally and reasonably reviewed consensus medical opinions or rec-
ommendations in the pertinent field—regardless whether conflicting medical 
opinions exist—the university has the right to determine that an individual is 
not otherwise medically qualified to play without violating the Rehabilitation 
Act. The place of the court in such cases is to make sure that the decision-
maker has reasonably considered and relied upon sufficient evidence specific 
to the individual and the potential injury, not to determine on its own which 
evidence it believes is more persuasive. (Knapp, 1997)
The NCAA’s core values include “[r]espect for institutional autonomy and 
philosophical differences” (NCAA, 2009). Consistent with this view, the Seventh 
Circuit observed,
we wish to make clear that we are not saying Northwestern’s decision 
necessarily is the right decision. We say only that it is not an illegal one 
under the Rehabilitation Act. On the same facts, another team physician at 
another university, reviewing the same medical history, physical evaluation, 
and medical recommendations, might reasonably decide that Knapp met 
the physical qualifications for playing on an intercollegiate basketball team. 
Simply put, all universities need not evaluate risk the same way. What we say 
in this case is that if substantial evidence supports the decision-maker—here 
Northwestern—that decision must be respected. (Knapp, 1997)16
Two other NCAA universities, Northeastern Illinois and Ashland University, 
subsequently permitted Knapp to play intercollegiate basketball. Knapp played 
basketball for both schools even though his defibrillator malfunctioned three times 
during “on-court” experiences—fortunately without any adverse personal health 
effects.
As a more mature legal scholar, my current opinion is that:
All things considered, the team physician medical judgment model places 
legitimate communitarian health and safety concerns above an athlete’s lib-
ertarian personal autonomy interests. If all concerned parties—the athlete, 
team physician, and school—cannot agree on the acceptability of assuming 
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an enhanced but medically uncertain risk on the playing field, it is better to 
err on the side of caution. (Mitten, 1998, p. 215)17
Conclusion
The NCAA and its member universities, as producers and internal regulators of 
intercollegiate sports, have valid legal and ethical authority to establish and 
enforce student-athlete eligibility rules that limit athletic performance or prohibit 
athletic participation for legitimate and important health reasons despite medical 
uncertainty. Student-athlete eligibility rules requiring compliance with the 
NCAA’s drug testing program and medical clearance by the university’s team 
physician establish appropriate limits and restrictions on the pursuit of excellence 
in intercollegiate sport to ensure good health. Before denying a student-athlete an 
opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics, both rules provide signifi-
cant procedural due process protections (i.e., a hearing before the CSMAS regard-
ing a positive drug test, or an individualized medical evaluation of a physical 
abnormality) that protect his or her legal rights and legitimate interests.
Notes
1.  In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt, concerned that 18 participants died and several 
were seriously injured while playing college football that year, summoned a group of col-
lege athletics leaders to the White House and directed them to implement reforms to make the 
sport safer, or he would push for federal legislation to ban football. On December 28, 1905 the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States was founded in New York City. It was 
renamed the National Collegiate Athletics Association in 1910.
2.  Before the Supreme Court’s Vernonia decision, some courts held that random, suspicion-
less drug testing of college athletes by a public university violates the federal constitution. Univ. 
of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993). Other courts ruled that the NCAA’s then-
existing drug testing program did not violate the federal constitution. O’Halloran v. Univ. of 
Washington, 679 F.Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.), rev’d on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 
1988).
3.  Other performers such as musicians take beta blockers, a prescription medication, to calm 
their nerves and enhance their ability to produce high quality music.
4.  Some college students take prescription drugs such as Aderall, a stimulant, or Provigil, 
which promotes wakefulness, as a means of improving their academic performance. Benedict 
Carey, Brain Enhancement Is Wrong, Right?, NY Times (Mar. 9, 2008)
5.  In United States v. Zahorian, No. 92–7003, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (3d Cir. July 
17, 1992), a federal appellate court upheld the conviction of a physician for prescribing anabolic 
steroids for a purpose other than disease treatment. In State Medical Board of Ohio v. Murray, 
613 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio 1993), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the revocation of a physician’s 
medical license for prescribing steroids to approximately two-hundred patients solely to enhance 
their athletic ability in violation of an Ohio statute.
6.  However, Dr. Fost adamantly opposes steroid use by adolescents because it can stunt their 
growth (Leroux, 2008).
7.  Public interest in sports competition among elite “human” athletes may wane if science 
becomes or is perceived to be the most significant factor influencing athletic achievement (e.g., 
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professional cycling in the wake of doping scandals involving Floyd Landis and others). See 
generally Mitten, 2006, p. 806: “The primary harm that results from athletes’ usage of banned 
performance-enhancing substances is to the sport’s integrity.”).
8.  For this reason, a future attempt to use state law to invalidate NCAA drug testing of 
student-athletes in Washington (or any other state) may violate the Dormant Commerce Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states from directly regulating interstate commerce 
such as intercollegiate athletics. In NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that a Nevada statute requiring the NCAA to provide certain procedural safeguards 
to Nevada universities, employees, and student-athletes in connection with its internal rules 
enforcement process violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because it would impermissibly 
regulate conduct occurring outside Nevada. To maintain nationally uniform rules enforcement 
procedures the NCAA would have been forced to conduct all proceedings in accordance with 
Nevada law, which may conflict with similar laws in other states.
9.  On August 4, 2008 the United States ratified the International Convention Against Doping 
in Sport, a treaty under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization, pursuant to which the signatory countries undertake to adopt national measures 
consistent with the principles of the WADA Code. The NCAA, however, is not required to 
modify its drug testing program to conform to the WADA Code unless Congress enacts a federal 
law mandating that it do so.
10.  Factors causing this decline include the removal of steroid precursors from the open 
market, increased year-round drug testing, and more education programs for student-athletes.
11.  From August 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007, the CSMAS denied six appeals, reduced one 
suspension to one-half year, and determined that no suspension was appropriate in one case 
(National Center for Drug-Free Sport, 2006, 2007).
12.  Courts have held it is legally permissible to exclude an athlete from participating in com-
petitive sports with an infectious disease if no reasonable accommodation will prevent a direct 
threat to the health and safety of other participants. Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 813 (1999).
13.  One court has suggested that an educational institution’s only legal duty is to ensure that 
the student-athlete and his family are fully informed of the risks and make a rational decision 
regarding whether to play a sport with a physical abnormality. Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of 
Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 954 (D. N.J. 1980).
14.  Universities that receive federal funds are covered by the Rehabilitation Act, and courts 
have held the NCAA is subject to the ADA based on its control of its members’ athletics pro-
grams through its student-athlete eligibility requirements. Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp.2d 
1209 (E.D. Wash. 2001); Bowers v. NCAA, 118 F. Supp.2d 494 (D. N.J. 2000); Tatum v. NCAA, 
992 F. Supp.2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
15.  To be protected by the federal disability discrimination laws, a student-athlete’s physical 
impairment must substantially limit a major life activity. Some courts have held that playing an 
intercollegiate sport is not itself a major life activity, so it may be necessary to show that his or 
her physical impairment affects a recognized major life activity such as seeing, hearing, walking, 
or breathing. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1274 (1997).
16.  Similarly, in Pahulu v University of Kansas, 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995) a federal 
district court upheld the team physician’s “conservative” medical disqualification of a college 
football player with an abnormally narrow cervical canal after an episode of transient quad-
riplegia during a scrimmage. After consulting with a neurosurgeon, the team physician con-
cluded that the athlete was at extremely high risk for sustaining permanent, severe neurologic 
injury, including permanent quadriplegia, if he continued playing football. The athlete wanted 
to resume playing because three other medical specialists concluded that he was at no greater 
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risk of permanent paralysis than any other player. The university agreed to honor the athlete’s 
scholarship, although he was not allowed to play football despite his willingness to sign a waiver 
absolving the university of legal liability if he were injured. The court held that university offi-
cials’ adherence to the team physician’s recommendation against playing does not violate the 
Rehabilitation Act, concluding that the university’s medical disqualification decision “has a 
rational and reasonable basis and is supported by substantial competent evidence for which the 
court is unwilling to substitute its judgment.”
17.  I favor adoption of an athlete informed consent model for professional athletes, which 
would permit an athlete to choose to participate in a professional sport, despite medical disquali-
fication by the team physician, if another qualified and well-respected physician (preferably a 
specialist) provides medical clearance (see Mitten, 1998, pp. 221–223).
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